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The Dark Side of Electoralism:  
Opinion Polls and Voting in the 2016  
Philippine Presidential Election 
Ronald D. Holmes 
Abstract: Despite the limits of elections as a mechanism to secure ac-
countability and ensure substantive representation, the 2016 elections 
drew the highest turnout across elections held since the political transi-
tion in 1986, a clear indication of electoralism. The high turnout may be 
a result of a relatively tightly contested race, with each of the main con-
tenders appealing to constituencies that they symbolically represent. 
Nonetheless, the 2016 Presidential elections remained personality-orient-
ed, media driven and political clan dominated. The eventual winner, 
Rodrigo Roa Duterte, garnered the presidency given a combination of 
factors: the clarity of his campaign message – focused on curbing a single 
problem (criminality, in general, and the illegal drug trade, in particular) 
that he elevated as the most serious concern that the next president 
should address; significant support from a geographic area (Mindanao) 
and associated ethno-linguistic groups (i.e., Bisaya); and, serious ques-
tions of character and competence raised against his opponents (i.e. 
Binay, Poe and Roxas).  
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The polls are at the heart of our political culture, it is a signal for 
change and an emblem of our collective decisions – and of who 
we are and what we value. (Introduction, Philippine Election Almanac 
2013, Presidential Communications Development and Strategic 
Office, Office of the Philippine President) 
Introduction 
The Philippines was the first country in Asia to hold elections, shortly 
after the turn of the 20th century, and many Filipinos continue to partici-
pate enthusiastically in the political process. For a country where suffrage 
is a right rather than an obligation, data from the International Institute 
of Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) indicates 
that a sizeable majority of Filipinos vote, ranging from 64 per cent in 
2007 to 90 per cent in 1987. The International IDEA database also 
shows that the average turnout in Philippine legislative and presidential 
elections from 1945 to 2010 was slightly higher (at 78.4 per cent and 77.8 
per cent, respectively) than the Asian average of 70.8 per cent and 75.6 
per cent, respectively.1  
While voting turnout has remained high, other forms of political 
participation have waned. Although there is no measure of political party 
membership, longitudinal survey data from Pulse Asia Research Inc. 
shows that only about one-tenth of the Filipino population favour a 
particular political party. This figure reflects that Filipinos do not really 
regard parties as an instrument of pursuing their interests. Moreover, this 
also suggests that parties have not performed their job of recruitment, 
education, and representation to the extent that a larger segment of the 
population will express continuous and significant preferences for any of 
these formal institutions of representation. 
Beyond parties, the public has also not taken on other modes of 
participation. Membership in civil society organisations, as well as in a 
basic sector group such as labour unions, has declined over the last three 
decades (Holmes 2016). Since the political transition in 1986, there have 
only been two episodes of significant popular unrest, the first in 1986 
and the second in early 2001, both of which forced incumbent presidents 
out of office.  
Thus, voting remains the primary mode of political participation, 
notwithstanding the fact that this periodic political exercise has been a 
less than satisfactory instrument in securing political accountability. This 
                                                 
1  See <www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?id=177>. 
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reality reflects what Anderson (1998: 266–267) referred to as the Janus-
face of electoralism, with a positive and negative side. Anderson con-
cluded that: 
the logic of electoralism is in the direction of domestication: dis-
tancing, punctuating, isolating. If one asks in whose interests this 
domestication occurs, one comes immediately to the question of 
representation […] The point to be underscored is rather that one 
effect of electoralism is in the direction of confining active and 
regular participation to specialists – professional politicians – who 
not only have a strong interest in their institutionalized oligopoly, 
but who are largely drawn from particular social strata, most often 
the middle and upper middle classes. (Anderson 1998: 267) 
The run up to and the results of the 2016 elections affirm this dark side 
of electoralism. Reviewing survey data, the dynamics of the campaign 
and the results of the presidential elections, I argue that these elections 
remained political clan-dominated, personality-oriented and media driven. 
I also recognise that the victor in the 2016 presidential election was pro-
pelled to victory due in part to prolonged “candidate bashing” of the 
other main contenders and the failure of the outgoing administration to 
institutionalise and remain true to their promise of treading a straight 
path toward good governance.  
The remainder of this article is divided into four parts. The first 
provides a brief profile of the presidential candidates, reviewing their 
records as elective and appointed public officials. The second part of the 
article reviews the pre-election surveys and the shifts in the public’s elec-
toral preferences. That also dissects the preferences of Filipino voters 
across socio-economic and demographic groups, as well as in different 
geographic areas. I argue that support for specific candidates was most 
stable among the ethno-linguistic and geographic areas that specific can-
didates belonged to. The third section of the article discusses the strate-
gies employed and issues confronted by each of the candidates. The final 
section provides a brief description of the importance of media, the main 
battlefield in the electoral campaign, where the public’s views of each 
candidates were shaped.  
The Candidates 
The presidential race pitted one pro-administration contender, Manuel 
“Mar” Araneta Roxas II, against four other candidates who presented 
themselves as “alternatives” to the presidency of Benigno “Ninoy” S. 
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Aquino III by emphasizing the “deficiencies” of the outgoing admin-
istration. These candidates were the incumbent Vice President Jejomar 
“Jojo” C. Binay, Senator Grace Poe, Davao City Mayor Rodrigo Roa 
Duterte and Senator Miriam Palma Defensor-Santiago (who was ill dur-
ing the campaign and died of lung cancer shortly thereafter). A sixth 
candidate, who remained in the ballot despite his demise, prior to the 
election was former party-list representative Roy Villareal Señeres.  
The anointed administration candidate, Roxas, was the Liberal Par-
ty’s putative choice in the 2010 elections until he gave way to Noynoy 
Aquino in September 2009. Sliding down to the vice presidential race, 
Roxas had been ahead of the other contenders in the 2010 race until 
mid-April 2010, when Binay closed in. Binay subsequently won the vice 
presidential race with the smallest margin of any vice presidential contest 
since 1935, with 41.7 per cent of the votes to Roxas’ 39.6 per cent. In 
2011, Roxas was appointed to the Aquino cabinet, first as secretary of 
transportation and communication and later as secretary of interior and 
local government in 2012. Roxas was declared the Liberal Party presiden-
tial candidate in July 2015. 
Of the candidates for president, Binay was first to declare his inten-
tion to run for the presidency, shortly after being elected as vice presi-
dent in 2010. A long-time mayor of the main Metro Manila commercial 
business city of Makati, Binay was appointed as vice president by Presi-
dent Aquino to the cabinet as chair of the housing commission and was 
also assigned as special envoy for Overseas Filipino Workers concerns. 
From 2010 until he faced serious corruption allegations in August 2014, 
Binay enjoyed majority approval and trust from the public, with his pop-
ularity rivalling that of President Aquino. Binay’s significant political 
capital was also proven when his daughter, a political neophyte, finished 
fifth (out of 12 winning candidates) in the 2013 senatorial elections. In 
this 2013 midterm election, Binay created his own coalition, the United 
Nationalist Alliance, which fielded nine candidates for senator, three 
(Nancy Binay, JV Ejercito and Gregorio Honasan) of whom won. Given 
his generally favourable opinion polls ratings and his political capital, 
Binay was the man to beat for the presidential race.  
Another popular candidate in mid-2015 was neophyte Senator 
Grace Poe. Poe was the adopted daughter of the late popular movie star, 
Fernando Poe Jr., himself a candidate for the presidency in the 2004 
elections. She had been a senator for less than two years when her name 
was floated as a possible presidential contender. Having topped the sena-
torial elections in 2013, Poe performed creditably in her first few years in 
the Senate, facilitating the passage of the Senate’s version of the Free-
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dom of Information Act and chairing the committee on peace and order. 
Given her popularity in pre-election polls, Poe was courted by the Liber-
al Party to run in tandem with Mar Roxas. Instead, she declared her own 
candidacy for president in September 2015. 
Miriam Defensor-Santiago was the fourth candidate. A multi-term 
senator, Defensor-Santiago served in every branch of government, from 
her initial work as a judge in a regional trial court, to her appointment as 
Immigration Commissioner and Agrarian Reform Secretary under the 
first Aquino administration (Corazon C. Aquino, president from 1986–
1992), and her election as a senator, first in 1995 and subsequently in 
2004 and 2010. The presidential run in 2016 was her third run for the 
presidency. In her first campaign, she finished a close second to Fidel 
Ramos in 1992, garnering close to one-fifth of the popular vote. In 1998, 
she vied for the presidency again, finishing seventh among 10 candidates, 
with barely 3 per cent of the popular vote. Aside from losing in two 
presidential elections, Defensor-Santiago also failed to win in her senato-
rial re-election bid in 2001, running under the Pwersa ng Masa (Force of 
the Masses) coalition, supported by recently deposed president Joseph E. 
Estrada and finishing 15th out of 38th candidates. Despite her electoral 
debacles, Defensor-Santiago is known to be a firebrand and maverick 
and had always campaigned on an anti-corruption platform. During the 
campaign she downplayed reports that she remained seriously ill despite 
claiming to have recovered from lung cancer (she died in September 
2016).2 
The last candidate for president was Rodrigo Duterte, long-time 
mayor of the country’s largest city, Davao. Duterte was being pushed to 
run for the presidency in early 2014 by supporters from Mindanao. From 
that time until he formally announced that he would run as president in 
December 2015, Duterte repeatedly said that he was not running for the 
presidency and at one point even remarked: “I’m telling the Filipino 
people, huwag ako. It’s going to be bloody,” he said. “Because I will not 
sit there as president and just like any other regime, sabihin ko, iyan lang 
ang kaya ko […] pero pag nilagay ninyo ako [do not fuck with me].”3 
                                                 
2  Given her illness, Defensor-Santiago was generally not seen as a serious con-
tender and did not campaign consistently. Her major role as a candidate ap-
peared to be to serve as the presidential contender on a ticket with Ferdinand 
“Bongbong” Romualdez Marcos, Jr. as vice presidential candidate. Marcos, the 
former dictator Ferdinand E. Marcos’ only son, nearly won the vice presidency. 
3  See <www.rappler.com/nation/politics/elections/2016/110679-duterte-contra 
dictions-dictatorship> (10 January 2017). 
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However, a key informant4 revealed that the plans for Duterte’s 
presidential run were finalised in early 2014 when Duterte himself agreed 
to hold a “roadshow” or “listening tours”, primarily on his federalism 
advocacy. While he did fail to submit his certificate of candidacy for the 
presidential elections by the October 2015 deadline, allegedly due to 
familial concerns, the ground was laid for him to come in as a substitute 
when his party, the Partido Demokratikong Pilipino-Laban (PDP-Laban), 
fielded a candidate who then stepped aside for Duterte.  
Pre-election Preferences 
In the run-up to the 2016 presidential elections, Pulse Asia Research Inc. 
(Pulse Asia, for brevity), conducted a number of pre-election surveys, 
some as part of its quarterly Ulat ng Bayan (Report of the Public, UB) or 
monthly Pulso ng Bayan (Pulse of the Public, PB) surveys. In addition to 
its own surveys, Pulse Asia was commissioned by a major broadcast 
network, ABS-CBN, to conduct weekly pre-election tracking surveys. 
Figure 1 shows the pre-election preferences of the eventual five con-
tenders in the presidential race.5 
Figure 1 shows the floors (lowest) and ceilings (highest) of the pre-
election preferences of all the candidates. Binay’s “ceiling” was 41 per 
cent in June 2014, in a survey that did not yet include Duterte. Binay’s 
floor was 17 per cent, registered in the last ABS-CBN survey conducted 
by Pulse Asia Inc. before the election. Poe, on the other hand, was poll-
ing at 30 per cent in two surveys held in June 2015 and January 2016, 
with her lowest pre-election support posted in September 2014. Roxas’ 
ceiling was 22 per cent, recorded in the UB of March 2016 and again in 
the last ABS-CBN survey of late April 2016. Defensor-Santiago’s pre-
election preference was highest in UB November 2014, at 12 per cent, 
while her floor, 1 per cent, was recorded in the ABS-CBN survey of 5–
10 April 2016. Finally, Duterte’s floor was a double-digit 12 per cent in 
UB March 2015, despite his continued rejection of the suggestion/pres-
sure to run as president. 
                                                 
4  The key informant is a political strategist who has worked in various electoral 
campaigns in the Philippines, including the campaign team of a leading con-
tender in the 2016 Philippine presidential elections. 
5  In earlier pre-election surveys, the names of other probable contenders, drawn 
up by Pulse Asia’s academic fellows, were included. Duterte’s name was includ-
ed only in the March 2015 Ulat ng Bayan survey, given his earlier public pro-
nouncements that he would not vie for the presidency.  
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Figure 1. Presidential Pre-Election Polls, Pulse Asia Research Inc., March 
2014–April 2016 
 
  
  22 Ronald D. Holmes 
 
His highest polling figure was 34 per cent, registered in the ABS-CBN 
survey of 12–17 April 2016. Election Day marked Duterte’s peak, and 
also the zenith of his rivals, specifically Binay and Poe, who had both 
reached their peak before or just at the beginning of the formal cam-
paign period in early February 2016. 
More than the floors and ceilings, the shifts in pre-election prefer-
ences indicated in the figures could be explained by the developments 
(such as a controversy or an issue) that affected voting support for each 
of the candidates and the effectiveness of the candidates in addressing 
the issue/s that confronted them or that mattered to the public.  
Dissecting Pre-Election Preferences across Geographic 
Areas/Socio-Demographic Groups 
The Philippine voting population can be disaggregated by geographic 
area, age, socio-economic class and other socio-demographic attributes. 
For the first time in Philippine election history, the Commission on 
Elections disseminated the distribution of the registered voting popula-
tion by area, age and gender. With regard to area, Figure 2 shows that 
more than half of the country’s registered voters reside in Luzon (Na-
tional Capital Region to Region V), with the Visayas (Region VI to Re-
gion VIII) and Mindanao (Region IX to Caraga) each sharing more than 
one-fifth of total registered voters. Overseas Absentee Voters (OAVs) 
constituted less than 2.5 per cent of the total number of registered voters 
for the 2016 elections.  
In terms of age, the Commission on Elections’ (COMELEC) data 
on registered voters indicates that almost half of the voters belong to a 
generation born proximate to or after the political transition in 1986, the 
18–24 and 25–34 age groups (see Table 1). 
The majority (51.5 per cent, or more than 28 million voters) of reg-
istered voters for the 2016 elections were women, with men constituting 
the remainder (with more than 26.3 million male registered voters), six 
per cent less than the female registered voters. 
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Figure 2. Registered Voters by Area: Number and as % of Total 
 
 
  
  24 Ronald D. Holmes 
 
Table 1. Registered Voters by Age, Commission on Elections 2015 
Age Group Number %
18–19 3,043,411 5.60
20–24 7,983,167 14.68
25–29 7,370,037 13.56
30–34 6,333,398 11.65
35–39 5,764,839 10.60
40–44 5,100,591 9.38
45–49 4,680,698 8.61
50–54 4,025,439 7.40
55–59 3,367,013 6.19
60–64 2,596,255 4.78
65–Above 4,098,996 7.54
 
Beyond the official statistics, voters are also disaggregated based on so-
cio-economic classification and ethno-linguistic groups by social and 
market research organisations. In terms of socio-economic classification, 
a roster of criteria is used to distribute the population into five economic 
classifications – A, B, C, D and E. These criteria include characteristics 
of the neighbourhood, the durability of the house, home maintenance, 
home ownership, educational attainment, total household monthly in-
come, occupation of the household head, household facilities, and the 
presence of household help. In the public opinion surveys of Pulse Asia 
Research Inc., the socio-economic classes are clustered into three main 
classifications: Class ABC, Class D, and Class E. Class D, the largest 
socio-economic classification, is further divided into Classes D1 and D2, 
with the ownership of their residential lot being the discriminant. Based 
on surveys conducted over the years, Class ABC constitutes approxi-
mately 5–10 per cent of the total Philippine population, class D around 
65–75 per cent (with subclass D1 slightly higher than subclass D2), and 
class E around 20–30 per cent. 
Finally, the primary language spoken at home enables survey re-
search organisations to determine the ethno-linguistic distribution of the 
Philippine population. Based on the distribution of the respondents in 
Pulse Asia’s surveys from January to April 2016, the largest ethno-
linguistic group is the Tagalogs, constituting close to 40 per cent of the 
respondents, followed by Cebuanos, comprising 21–23 per cent. The 
other major groups are Ilonggos (around 9 per cent), Ilocanos (around 7 
per cent), Bicolanos (around 6 per cent), Kapampangans (around 4 per 
cent), Warays (around 4 per cent), and Pangasinenses (around 2 per cent). 
Other ethno-lingusitic groups account for the remaining 7–8 per cent. 
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Among these geographic/socio-demographic variables, pre-election 
surveys show that candidates often generated considerably more support 
from areas that they came from or the ethnolinguistic group that they 
belonged to. During the campaign, all the candidates highlighted their 
geographic origin or their ethnolinguistic affiliation. Binay rooted himself 
in his parents’ provinces, Batangas (in Region IV) and Isabela (in Region 
2). Grace Poe traced her origins to her great grandfather’s birthplace, 
Pangasinan (in Region 1). Mar Roxas (like Miriam Defensor-Santiago) 
was a former representative of Capiz (In Region 6) and is an Ilonggo 
(again, like Defensor-Santiago); Ilonggo is a language spoken in Region 
VI and in Negros Occidental in the Visayas region. Finally, Duterte, 
born in Cebu (a Cebuano), grew up and served as a public servant in 
Davao City in Mindanao. Table 2 shows the areas where specific candi-
dates drew marginally or significantly higher6 support across the pre-
election surveys. 
With respect to ethnolinguistic groups, Duterte, Roxas and Poe reg-
istered significantly higher support among the ethnolinguistic groups to 
which they belong. In the case of Duterte, his share of the Cebuano 
votes was consistently higher than his national-level preferences across 
all pre-election surveys, with 42 per cent, 43.9 per cent, 41 per cent and 
62.7 per cent of the Cebuano votes in the January, February, March and 
April 2016 pre-election surveys, respectively. Roxas also recorded con-
sistently higher voting support among his fellow Ilonggos, garnering 38.1 
per cent, 39 per cent, 46.4 per cent and 33.7 per cent pre-election sup-
port across the four pre-election surveys of 2016. Finally, Poe’s pre-
election preference among the Tagalogs was marginally to slightly higher 
than her national preferences across the pre-election surveys.  
In terms of socio-economic classes, the preferences of most candi-
dates from each socio-economic class did not significantly diverge from 
their national pre-election preference, with the exception of Binay’s sig-
nificantly higher preference from Class E, recorded in the January PB 
(30.1 per cent against a national 23.3 per cent), the February PB (31 per 
cent versus the national 25.5 per cent) and the March UB (22.5 per cent 
versus the national 30.3 per cent). 
  
                                                 
6  The margins of error for the sub-national areas included in the table are as 
follows: +/- 10.3 per cent for Region 1; +/- 12.2 per cent for Region 2; +/- 11 
per cent for Region VII; +/- 11 per cent for Negros Island Group; +/- 10.6 
for Northern Mindanao; +/- 10.6 for Davao region; +/- 11 per cent for 
Soccsksargen; and +/- 13.9 per cent for CARAGA.  
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Table 2. Geographic Areas with Significantly Higher Pre-election Prefer-
ences for Presidential Candidates, Various Pulse Asia Pre-
election surveys (December 2015 to April 2016) 
Candi-
date 
Range of National 
Pre-election Prefer-
ence (share in %, 
survey date) 
Sub-national 
geographic 
area (region/ 
province) 
Range of Subnational 
Area Pre-election 
preference (share in %, 
survey date) 
Low High Low High 
Binay 16.4 
(April 
2016) 
32.6  
(Decem-
ber 2015) 
Cagayan Valley 
(Region II) 
30.1  
(March 
2016) 
67.2  
(Decem-
ber 2015) 
Duterte 19.7  
(January 
2016) 
34.5  
(April 
2016) 
Northern 
Mindanao 
(Region X) 
29.7 
(Decem-
ber 2015) 
58.9 
(April 
2016) 
Davao Region 
(Region XI) 
84.3  
(January 
2016) 
92.5 
(April 
2016) 
Soccsksargen 
(Region XII) 
28.1 
(February 
2016) 
61.2 
(April 
2016) 
   CARAGA 
(Region XIII) 
26 
(January 
2016) 
61.1 
(March 
2016) 
Poe 21.1  
(De-
cember 
2015) 
30.5  
(January 
2016) 
Ilocos Region 
(Region I) 
27.7  
(April 
2016) 
56.2  
(January 
2016) 
Roxas 17.1  
(De-
cember 
2016) 
20.7  
(March 
2016) 
Western Visa-
yas (Region 
VI) 
39  
(April 
2016) 
52.6  
(March 
2016) 
Negros Island 
Region 
24.4  
(April 
2016) 
62.2  
(March 
2016) 
Note:  Surveys included in the table are the Pulse Asia Research Inc. Ulat ng Bayan 
of December 2015 and March 2016 and the Pulso ng Bayan of January, Feb-
ruary, and April 2016. 
Among the candidates, however, it was only Duterte who constantly had 
a marginally higher level of support from Class ABC, relative to his na-
tional voting support, in the pre-election surveys from January 2016 to 
April 2016.7 Duterte’s marginally higher pre-election preference in Class 
                                                 
7  Support for Duterte from Class ABC was 23.9, 23.6 per cent, 32.5 per cent and 
43.5 per cent in the January, February, March and April 2016 surveys, respec-
tively. These figures were 4.2 per cent, 2.2 per cent, 8.7 per cent and 9 per cent 
higher, respectively, than his national level support. The margins of error for 
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ABC may be explained by the class’ greater concern for issues pertaining 
to personal safety.  
There were no significant variances in voting support based on 
gender and age. Male voters showed only marginally higher preference 
for Duterte and female voters only registered marginally higher prefer-
ence for Poe. Preferences among age groups tended to shift from one 
survey to another, although the leading contenders in the pre-election 
surveys – Duterte and Poe – had significantly higher shares among the 
younger age groups (18–24 and 25–34).  
The patterns of voting support registered in pre-election surveys re-
affirm the salience of geographic and ethno-linguistic variables identified 
in a previous study by Lande, who studied the 1992 elections (Lande 
1996). Beyond securing support from their bailiwicks, the outcome of 
the 2016 presidential election was determined by the effectiveness of the 
response of select candidates to challenges and allegations against them 
and the traction that their campaign thrust or messages obtained. 
Candidate Strategies and Issues 
Binay: Hounded by Corruption Allegations 
Among the candidates, Vice President “Jojo” Binay’s presidential run 
was strongly damaged by a corruption scandal that broke in August 2014. 
It was from this date that a subcommittee of the Senate’s Committee on 
the Accountability of Public Officials and Investigations (otherwise 
known as the Blue Ribbon Committee) started its investigation into the 
allegation that Binay, when he was mayor of the City of Makati, had 
personally benefited from an overpriced City Hall building. The sub-
committee was comprised of known Binay opponents, including Senator 
Aquilino “Koko” Pimentel, Senator Alan Peter Cayetano, and Senator 
Antonio “Sonny” Trillanes IV. In the course of almost a year and a half, 
allegations of plunder and unexplained wealth were levelled against Binay 
in the Blue Ribbon sub-committee, with damaging testimonies from 
former Makati officials that included former allies of Binay, former Vice 
Mayor Ernesto Mercado and former councillors Renato Bondal and 
Narciso Enciso. The allegations included Binay’s ownership of a vast 
property in Batangas and the overpricing of public projects in Makati, 
                                                                                                    
Class ABC in these surveys were January 8.8 per cent, February 9.4 per cent, 
March 8.9 per cent and April 9 per cent. 
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from an education building to the free cakes given to senior citizens in 
Makati on their birthdays. 
While Binay dismissed the charges as politically motivated, his rejec-
tion of a summoning from the sub-committee to appear and present 
counter-evidence, as well as his subsequent withdrawal from a one-on-
one debate against Senator Trillanes IV, allowed the allegations to hound 
him during the campaign. Aside from this, the fate of Binay’s son, Je-
jomar Erwin (“Junjun”) Binay, who was suspended and eventually dis-
missed by the ombudsman as mayor of Makati, provided additional am-
munition for the corruption allegations against Binay. The younger Binay 
was dismissed and perpetually barred from holding public office by the 
ombudsman in October 2015 for his role in the overpriced Makati City 
Hall building. Finally, the pending graft cases against Binay’s wife, 
Elenita, who served as mayor of Makati from 1998 to 2001, also gar-
nered much media attention. All told, the Binays were under siege during 
the campaign.   
Immediately after the investigation started, Binay’s support declined 
from 41 per cent in the June 2014 UB to 31 per cent in the September 
2014 UB. While his pre-election preference stabilised from September 
2014 (and even increased as a result of a controversy that affected Grace 
Poe in late 2015) until late March 2016, Binay’s poor performance in the 
second debate resuscitated the public’s attention to the serious allega-
tions of corruption against the Vice President. Binay’s demeanour during 
this debate, in which the issue of corruption was extensively discussed, 
may have been the cause of consistent decline in his voter support. Pre-
vented by the organisers from presenting documents in his possession, 
Binay was visibly frustrated and irked in the course of the debate, rush-
ing off the stage at the end of the debate while his adversaries shook 
hands and exchanged pleasantries.  
Though Binay’s responses to the corruption allegations were not di-
rect or definitive, he did try to address the allegations through a commu-
nication’s campaign that portrayed him as a typical victim of the elite. 
The highlight of this public relations effort was Binay’s campaign team 
transforming the normally pejorative term, nognog (which is usually trans-
lated as “nigger”) into a word that would win support for the vice presi-
dent. In an advertisement that ran regularly on radio and television in the 
last quarter of 2015 onwards, Binay (who is dark-skinned) appropriated 
the label and claimed that “nognog” stood for a typical Filipino who is 
sun-drenched from tilling the land, forced to work abroad, teaching 
without a decent classroom, without money to buy food, or someone 
falsely accused of a crime. The advertisement ended with Binay’s slogan 
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– “ginhawa ay dama ng lahat, kay Jojo Binay” (comfort felt by all, with Jojo 
Binay).  
However, this advertising campaign failed to win back sufficient 
support for Binay. For a public that has consistently told pollsters that 
corruption is an urgent national concern,8 Binay’s claim that corruption 
allegations against him were politically motivated did not improve his 
image, which had suffered seemingly irreparable damage from corrup-
tion allegations and the accumulation of unexplained wealth during his 
long incumbency as mayor of the country’s premier commercial/busi-
ness city.  
Poe Questionable Qualifications for the Presidency 
Another leading contender in early polls, Grace Poe, also had to contend 
with equally serious allegations: questions about her citizenship. From 
June 2015 until early March 2016, Poe was dogged by three questions: 
whether she could be considered a natural-born citizen given that she 
was a foundling (orphan) whose parentage was uncertain; whether she 
had the 10- year continuous residency required of presidential candidate; 
and whether, by acquiring U.S. citizenship, she had lost her natural-born 
status, which is a requirement for the presidency (assuming of course she 
was considered a natural born citizen in the first place).  
The first set of cases related to Poe’s citizenship issues were filed 
with COMELEC. In separate COMELEC decisions, and subsequent 
ratification by the COMELEC en banc, Poe’s certification of candidacy 
was cancelled by COMELEC. Immediately after receipt of the COME-
LEC’s decision, Poe filed a case with the Supreme Court to nullify such 
decisions. On 8 March 2016, the Supreme Court granted Poe’s petition, 
nullifying COMELEC’s earlier decision and declaring Poe qualified to 
run for the presidency.  
The effect of such challenges to Poe’s candidacy is evidenced by the 
decline of her voting support between UB surveys of June 2015 and 
September and December 2015. In view of the incremental decline, Poe 
released an advertisement in mid-December 2015 that likened her situa-
tion to that of her late father, who also faced a disqualification case, also 
on the grounds of citizenship, when he vied for the presidency in 2004. 
At the end of the advertisement, which was played frequently on radio 
and television, the Supreme Court’s decision allowing her father to run 
was underscored. In the January 2016 UB, Poe’s voter support signifi-
                                                 
8  Fighting graft and corruption registers as one of the top urgent national con-
cerns in the quarterly surveys of Pulse Asia Research Inc. 
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cantly increased to 30 per cent. Having dealt with the citizenship chal-
lenge, however, Poe’s team neglected to direct their attention towards 
clearly articulating what a Poe presidency stood for, beyond the abstract 
galing at puso (competence and compassion/heart) slogan and the vague 
20-point programme she articulated in her formal declaration for the 
presidency in mid-September 2015. Thus, while she and her team ex-
pected that a favourable decision of the Supreme Court on her citizen-
ship case would sustain, if not increase her lead in the polls, the failure to 
clarify the proposed thrust of her administration, to differentiate her 
from the other contenders, led her voter support to stagnate at about 25 
per cent of voters, a figure that dropped to one-fifth as many voters 
swung to Duterte starting at the end of March 2016. 
Roxas: Straight Line for the Straight Path Candidate 
Figure 1 shows that the administration candidate, Mar Roxas, maintained 
basically the same level of support from September 2015 until the last 
survey of late April 2016. The only significant movement in Roxas’s 
support was recorded from the June 2015 UB, when he had 10 per cent, 
to the September 2015 UB, when he registered 20 per cent. The Sep-
tember 2015 UB was conducted soon after Roxas was declared the offi-
cial candidate of the Liberal Party. 
Roxas’ failure to expand his voting support could be attributed to 
his having campaigned with the thrust of continuity; more specifically, to 
sustain the commitment of the Aquino administration to follow the 
straight (non-corrupt) path (daang matuwid). While there is nothing inher-
ently wrong with promising continuity, the Roxas campaign team failed 
to recognise early the limits of the daang matuwid vow. In promising to 
sustain the good governance efforts, Roxas essentially discarded one-
quarter of the voting population,9 which were of the opinion that the 
Aquino administration had failed to fulfil its commitment to daang 
matuwid. Moreover, Roxas failed to adequately address important issues 
that had dogged his presidential run in 2010; namely, questions of com-
petence and his lack of connection with the average person.  
Roxas was puzzled by questions about his competence. Among the 
candidates, Roxas was the only one to have experience in two branches 
of government. He was a member of the lower and upper house and 
                                                 
9  In surveys conducted by Pulse Asia, from September 2014 to December 2015, 
only one-third of the public agreed that the Aquino administration was ful-
filling/fulfilled the vow to trek daang matuwid, with one-quarter being of the 
opinion that the Aquino administration had failed to fulfill this commitment.  
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even topped the senatorial race in 2010. Roxas also served as a member 
of the cabinet in three presidential administrations – Estrada, Arroyo and 
Aquino III. Despite such experience, Roxas has been criticised for his 
indecisiveness. In his first cabinet portfolio under Aquino III, as trans-
portation secretary, Roxas was also criticised for failing to address the 
major problems of mass transportation that were blamed for the terrible 
traffic congestion in Metro Manila and other major cities. In his subse-
quent position as interior secretary, Roxas was also criticised for his 
handling of the relief mission in severely affected areas by Typhoon 
Yolanda. 
Criticism of Roxas’ supposed lack of connection with the public is 
rooted in the fact that he comes from a very affluent family. Roxas’ 
campaign team tried to remedy this deficiency through an advertisement 
that aired in late January 2016, titled “walang drama, trabaho lang [no drama, 
all work].” In the advertisement, Roxas states: 
They say I didn’t grow up poor. That I don’t have a dramatic story. 
But the elections aren’t about me. It’s about you and your family. I 
won’t give you drama. I’ll focus on creating jobs for you. That’s 
what I know. That’s what I’m good at.10 
Based on the pre-election survey results, however, the advertisement did 
not improve Roxas’ standing, keeping the candidate espousing the 
straight path with straight line pre-election preferences.  
Defensor-Santiago: Saddled by Severe Illness 
On her third try for the presidency, Miriam Defensor-Santiago was really 
a shadow of the candidate who almost won the position in 1992. Diag-
nosed with stage-four lung cancer in 2014, Defensor-Santiago nonethe-
less filed her certificate of candidacy in October 2015 as she launched 
the second volume of her best-selling book, Stupid is Forever More. In 
declaring her candidacy, Defensor-Santiago vowed that: “If I become 
president sometime in the very near future, this country will be much 
better than it was before. Today this country suffers from the malaise of 
plunder.”11 
However, her physical condition prevented Defensor-Santiago from 
campaigning. She did not participate in the second televised presidential 
                                                 
10  See <http://www.rappler.com/nation/politics/elections/2016/120382-mar-ro 
xas-political-advertisement-no-drama> (10 January 2017). 
11  See <www.rappler.com/nation/politics/elections/2016/109128-miriam-runn 
ing-for-president-in-2016> (10 January 2017). 
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debate and remained the only presidential contender with a constant 
single-digit pre-election preference. 
Duterte: From Local to National 
Rodrigo Duterte was definitely the star of the 2016 election. His was a 
stand-out performer, not simply because he won, but because his run for 
the presidency broke new ground: he was the first president to come 
from Mindanao and to be elected from a local position, as mayor of the 
city of Davao. In addition, Duterte’s presidential run was impressive as 
he slowly garnered voting support through what, based on key informant 
interviews, was a strategic campaign. Unlike other candidates, whose 
messages were quite abstract, Duterte repeatedly stressed one issue – 
criminality in general, and the pervasiveness of illegal drugs in particular. 
Survey data reveals the traction that such messaging had on voters. Pre-
sented with a roster of issues that a presidential candidate should address, 
Table 3 shows that, on aggregate, the fight against illegal drugs was 
deemed as the most important in the Pulse Asia PB surveys of January, 
February and April 2016. 
Table 3. Pulse Asia Pulso ng Bayan surveys, January, February and April 
2016 (Row in Per Cent) 
National Concerns Surveys
January 
2016 
February 
2016 
April 
2016 
Curbing the widespread sale and use of 
illegal drugs 36 39 41 
Improving the pay of workers 38 39 34
Fighting graft and corruption in gov-
ernment 30 30 31 
Reducing the poverty of many Filipi-
nos 29 31 30 
Controlling inflation 30 34 29
Creating more jobs 26 25 28
Fighting criminality 24 25 28
Enforcing the law on all whether influ-
ential or ordinary people 20 18 19 
Increasing peace in the country 12 12 13
Note:  Most urgent national concerns a presidential candidate should immediately 
address. 
Base: Registered Voters with Biometrics. 
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Duterte’s anti-crime message resonated because it was supported by his 
undisputed record of performance in addressing such a concern. Duterte 
also entered the race with all his possible “baggage” having already been 
revealed: his womanizing, his predilection towards swearing, and even a 
warning that if he becomes president, the public may regret it as he will 
not countenance any opposition.  
To differentiate himself from the outgoing administration, Duterte’s 
campaign carried the message that “change is coming.” This abstract 
promise was complemented by the slogan tapang at malasakit (courage 
and compassion), a characterisation of Duterte that first came out in a 
video circulated in social media in late May 2015.12 Later on, his cam-
paign team used this characterisation in its other campaign paraphernalia, 
this time directly linking the traits with Duterte through a statement 
Tapang at Malasakit si Duterte (Duterte is courageous and compassionate). 
Fusing the first syllable of each trait, the shortened message becomes 
Tama si Duterte (Duterte is right).  
Unlike other candidates, Duterte did not experience any significant 
decline in his pre-election voter support. The only marginal reduction 
was posted in January 2016, in the survey that followed his controversial 
cursing of Pope Francis (due to traffic caused by his visit to the Philip-
pines the year before). Even when Duterte publicly rejected suggestions 
to run for the presidency, his pre-election preference was in the double 
digits, even higher or close to the voting support of other contenders 
such as Poe and Roxas. Duterte’s decent pre-election voting support 
could be attributed to the roadshow he conducted on federalism from 
the middle of 2014 until the third quarter of 2015, and the media cover-
age he received given his colourful and straightforward responses to calls 
for him to run for president. Table 4 shows the voting support for 
Duterte across Pulse Asia’s non-commissioned surveys. 
  
                                                 
12  See <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/694654/tapang-at-malasakit-dutertes-allege 
d-campaign-pitch-circulating-in-social-media> (10 January 2017). 
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Table 4. Pre-Election Preference of Rodrigo Roa Duterte, Pulse Asia Ulat 
Ng Bayan and Pulso Ng Bayan Surveys, March 2015 to April 
2016 (Row in Per Cent) 
Area March 
2015 
June 2015 Sept 2015 Dec 
2015 
Philippines 12 15 16 23
National Capital 
Region 7 11 21 27 
Balance of Luzon 4 7 8 13
Visayas 9 13 14 18
Mindanao 34 37 29 43
 
Area Jan 2016 Feb 2016 March 
2016 
April 
2016 
Philippines 20 21 24 34
National Capital 
Region 16 23 27 40 
Balance of Luzon 8 10 15 22
Visayas 15 19 10 32
Mindanao 48 45 51 58
 
Across these surveys, Duterte’s national voting support showed signifi-
cant changes from September 2015 to December 2015 and from March 
2016 to April 2016. The rise of voting support in the December 2015 
UB can be attributed to Duterte’s formal declaration in late November 
2015 that he was running for president. 
The second significant change in Duterte’s preference was recorded 
in the April 2016 PB survey. This survey saw a 10 percentage point in-
crease in Duterte’s voting support, putting him ahead of the other presi-
dential contenders. The increase could be attributed to Duterte’s per-
formance in the second presidential debate, held in Cebu. Separate 
probes in the April 2016 Pulse Asia PB survey found that a significant 
majority of the public (65 per cent) had heard, read or watched anything 
related to the second presidential debate held in Cebu. Of those who 
read/watched/ listened to the debate or news about the debate, an 
equally significant majority (81 per cent) were of the opinion that the 
debate would influence their votes. Finally, Table 5 shows that the plu-
rality identified Duterte as the candidate who performed best in the de-
bate.  
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Table 5. Pulse Asia Pulso ng Bayan 16-20 April 2016 Survey on the Sec-
ond Presidential Debate (Row in Per Cent) 
Candidate Location Socio-
economic 
class 
RP NCR BL VIS MIN ABC D E 
Duterte, Rodrigo 34 37 26 23 58 46 32 39 
Poe, Grace 28 23 32 29 21 22 29 24 
Roxas, Mar 16 8 17 27 8 17 16 12 
Binay, Jojo 11 10 13 14 3 6 11 10 
Defensor-
Santiago, Miriam 3 6 2 2 2 6 3 1 
I don’t have 
enough knowledge 
to give an opinion 
6 8 7 5 3 2 6 9 
Don’t know/ 
Refused/ None 3 6 3 0 4 1 3 4 
Note:  Question: In your opinion, among the presidential candidates, who do you 
think did well in the debate?  
Base: Aware of the presidential debate, 65% of total respondents. 
 
A Media-Driven Campaign 
Most of the presidential candidates “barnstormed” extensively, with 
campaign rallies held all around the country, prior to and during the 
formal campaign period. Despite this, the 2016 presidential elections 
remained primarily media-driven. It is through media that candidates are 
able to broadcast their campaign promises, chiefly through advertise-
ments. The media also reported developments related to each candidate 
and their campaign sorties. As mentioned earlier, two out of three Filipi-
nos listened to, watched or read about the second presidential debate, 
although the actual proportion of those who viewed/listened to the 
debate as it was broadcast may actually be lower.13 The larger segment of 
the public may have read, watched or listened to news reports that re-
counted what transpired during the debates. 
                                                 
13  A ratings agency reported that viewership of the second debate was at 11.5 per 
cent in Mega Manila. See <www.lionheartv.net/2016/03/agb-nielsen-mega-ma 
nila-tv-ratings-march-18-march-20-2016-lip-sync-battle-philippines-remains-the 
-most-watched-saturday-program-tv5s-pilipi/> (10 January 2017). 
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The Filipino public is generally attentive to news. Asked about the 
frequency of watching/listening/reading news through various media, a 
majority indicate that they watch the news everyday on television. Table 
6 shows the results of Pulse Asia surveys on this probe. 
Table 6. News Tracking. Frequency of accessing news through media. 
Pulse Asia Research Surveys, January to March 2016, Philip-
pines (Row Per Cent) 
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Televi-
sion 
March 
2016 56 16 16 5 2 3 2 0.2 
Feb 
2016 61 17 14 4 2 1 1 1 
Jan 2016 57 18 16 4 2 1 2 0 
Radio March 
2016 17 8 13 11 6 7 26 13 
Feb 
2016 13 10 15 9 5 6 26 17 
Jan 2016 14 10 17 10 5 6 23 15 
News-
paper 
March 
2016 3 2 4 6 3 6 48 28 
Feb 
2016 2 1 4 5 4 6 41 36 
Jan 2016 3 2 4 6 3 7 66 8 
Internet March 
2016 5 4 5 3 1 2 16 64 
Feb 
2016 6 3 4 3 2 2 12 42 
Jan 2016 5 3 4 2 2 3 11 71 
 
 
As shown in Figure 3, media is identified by a significant majority of the 
public as the most influential source of information in choosing a presi-
dent. Television remains the primary source. 
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Figure 3. Most Influential Source of Information in Choosing a President, 
Pulse Asia Surveys, February 2010 to March 2016, Philippines 
(as a Percentage) 
 
Conclusion 
The results of the 2016 presidential elections are uncontested. Rodrigo 
Duterte won the presidency by a convincing margin, the outcome of a 
clear and focused campaign focused on a single issue – fighting crimi-
nality – backed by a record of prior performance in addressing this con-
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cern as Davao mayor. Based on the Commission on Elections report, the 
voter turnout in the 2016 elections was over 80 per cent, which is higher 
than prior electoral contests. While the results of several other races were 
questioned, from several local seats to the senatorial and vice presidential 
elections, a large segment of the public are of the opinion that the results 
of the races are believable.14  
The 2016 presidential elections had many of the same characteristics 
as previous ones. Personalities dominated. Various strategies were used 
to shore up the candidate’s positive characteristics and to deflect the 
negatives that may lead to the loss of voter support. While there were 
three presidential debates in which candidates presented their stance on 
issues, the variance in their positions was negligible. Candidates spent 
enormous sums in running their advertisements running and in mobilis-
ing brokers and networks of supporters. But the meat of their pro-
grammes, and virtually all candidates had a platform of action, was not 
covered in their campaign sorties or in their media appearances. Voter 
preference changed as a result of media reported events and the effective 
handling of challenges facing the contenders.  
Given the continuing nature of Philippine elections, borrowing and 
reiterating Anderson’s word – domesticating – what is unclear is whether 
the winner in the elections could deliver the change that is promised, 
especially at a time when citizens, in a post-election situation, are again 
demobilised.  
References 
Anderson, Benedict (1998), The Spectre of Comparison: Nationalism, Southeast 
Asia and the World, London: Verso. 
Holmes, R. (2016), Local Governments, Civil Society, Democratization 
and Development, in: F. Miranda and T. Rivera (eds), Chasing the 
Wind: Assessing Philippine Democracy, Quezon City: United Nations 
Development Program and Commission on Human Rights, 107–
141. 
Lande, Carl H. (1996), Post-Marcos Politics: A Geographical and Statistical 
Analysis of the 1992 Presidential Election, Singapore: Institute of South-
east Asian Studies. 
                                                 
14  Based on the July 2016 Ulat ng Bayan survey, 90 per cent of Filipinos regard the 
results of races in their area as believable, while 67 per cent believe that the re-
sults of the vice presidential contest are believable. 
